Review of Economic Studies (April 1, 2017) ，Jimmy Chan, Alessandro Lizzeri, Wing Suen, Leeat Yariv 发表文章 Deliberating Collective Decisions.

Deliberating Collective Decisions

Jimmy Chan

School of Economics, Fudan University

Alessandro Lizzeri

Department of Economics, NYU.

Wing Suen

School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong.

Leeat Yariv

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech.

内容简介Abstract:

We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date, agents decide whether to vote to adopt one of two alternatives or continue to collect more information. The process stops when a qualified majority vote for an alternative. Three main insights emerge from our analysis and are consistent with an array of stylized facts regarding committee decision making. First, majority rule is more vulnerable than super-majority rules to the disproportionate influence of impatient committee members. Second, more diverse preferences, more patient members, or more unanimous decision voting rules lead to lengthier deliberation and more accurate decisions. Last, balanced committees unanimously prefer to delegate deliberation power to a moderate chairman rather than be governed by a rule such as unanimity.

Keywords：

sequential likelihood ratio test, optimal stopping, swing voters, collective learning

摘要：

这篇文章我们展示了在异质的委员会中获取一系列信息的动态模型。在每一期，参与者会选择给两个候选人的一个候选人投票，或选择继续收集信息。当某一位候选人得到多数选票时，过程终止。我们的分析有三个主要的发现，并且这些发现与一系列关于委员会决策制定的典型化事实相符。首先，简单多数原则比绝对多数原则更容易受到不耐心的委员会成员因素的不成比例的影响。其次，更多元化的偏好，更耐心的成员，或者更统一的决策投票规则会使得协商过程更漫长，决策更精准。最后，处于平衡状态的委员会一致偏向于将协商权交给一位温和的主席，而非全体一致通过的规则来决定最后的裁定结果。

关键词:

序列似然比检验；最优停时；中间选民；群体学习

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