985数量经济与金融系列讲座第163期：Labor Market Cycles, Unemployment Insurance Eligibility, and Moral Hazard

题目：Labor Market Cycles, Unemployment Insurance Eligibility, and Moral Hazard

主讲人：Zhang, Min Assistant professor, SUFE

Abstract

If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the effects of UI to violations of its premises. Our baseline simulation shows that if the neutral contribution scheme derived in this contribution were to be implemented, the average unemployment rate in the United States would fall from 5.7 to 4.7 percent. Also, the results show that with endogenous UI eligibility, one can simultaneously generate realistic productivity driven cycles and realistic responses of unemployment to changes in UI benefits.