985数量经济与金融系列讲座第190期：CEO Incentive Dynamics and Their Effect on Firm Value


Abstract

Learning about a CEO’s unknown talent takes time and her incentives should rise as the board learns over her tenure with the firm. Using the ExecuComp data set from 1992 to 2007, examine the trajectory ofay–performance sensitivity (PPS) in the years immediately after CEOs assume their positions, along with firm value consequences. We show that target incentives are not achieved instantaneously, but instead evolve through a process by which CEO incentives increase gradually before eventually leveling off. Further, consistent with standard agency theory, we find that firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, rises along with this gradual increase in CEO incentives. Using two other measures (inside or outside CEOs and years before promotion) to further proxy for the learning process, we find more consistent, corroborating evidence.