中国宏观经济学系列讲座198期：(Strong）Implementability with Transfer

题目: (Strong）Implementability with Transfer

主讲：田建荣博士，北京大学国家发展研究院

时间：2024年6月12日 10:00-12:00

地点：复旦大学经济学院514会议室（国权路600号）

主办：上海市人民政府决策咨询研究基地袁志刚工作室、复旦大学就业与社会保障研究中心

摘要: We fully characterise (strong) implementability with transfer, without invoking quasilinearity, via a novel cyclical monotonicity condition that extends Rochet (1987). We then apply it to show, under the assumption of the possibility of compensation: (i) the single crossing condition, when type space is totally ordered and outcome space is partially ordered, is sufficient and necessary for strongly implementing all monotone allocations; and (ii) with the strict single crossing condition and totally ordered type space and outcome space, an allocation is implementable if and only if it is monotone. No additional structure or regularity conditions are needed.