主讲1：Brit Grosskopf, University of Exeter Department of Economics Streatham Court
主讲2：Rajiv Sarin, Dept. of Economics, University of Exeter, Streatham Court, Exeter, EX4 4PU, UK
主题1：Do you mind me paying less? Measuring Other-Regarding Preferences and Reputation Effects in the Market for Taxis
Abstract：We present a natural field experiment designed to measure other-regarding preferences and reputation effects in the market for taxis. We employed trained testers, of varying ethnicity, to take a number of predetermined taxi journeys. In each case we endowed them with only 80% of the expected fare. Testers revealed this to the driver mid-journey and asked for a portion of the journey for free. In a 2x2 between-subject design we vary the length of the journey and whether drivers have reputational concerns or not. We find that the majority of drivers give part of the journey for free and over 25% complete the journey in full. Giving is found to be proportional to the length of the journey. Further, we find no evidence of in-group favouritism, but strong out-group negativity against black testers by both white and South-Asian drivers. Reputation concerns cannot explain the drivers' behaviour on average, but are significant when drivers face white testers. The data lend support to the quantitative predictions of experiments that measure other-regarding preferences, and shed further light on how discrimination can manifest itself within our preferences.
主题2：A Model of Satisficing Behavior
Abstract：We build a dynamic model of satisficing behavior. We explicitly introduce the payoff the decision maker 'expects' from a strategy, where this expectation is adaptively formed. If the agent receives a payoff above her satisficing level she continues with the current action, updating what she expects from it. If she receives a payoff below her satisficing level and what she expects from the action falls below her satisficing level she updates both her satisficing level and what she expects from the strategy she has chosen. We show that in decision problem such satisficing behavior results in cautious choice. In games, we show that both risk dominant and payoff dominant choices may result. Both the cooperate only profile and defect only profile are equilibria in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
时间：2015年11月12日，16:00-17:30
地点：复旦大学经济学院614会议室
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