题目：Coin Offering and Security Regulation
Abstract： We present a model that rationalizes the use of initial coin offerings (ICOs), in which a company raises funds by pre-selling access to a later product or service. We demonstrate two mechanisms by which ICOs create value: First, they aggregate dispersed signals about project quality, harnessing the "wisdom of the crowd". Second, they solve a coordination problem inherent in many projects with network effects, where there is strategic complementarity in the participation of consumers. Through either of these mechanisms, ICOs increase project value and facilitate investment of positive NPV projects. We apply our results to the current debate on the efficiency and optimal regulatory treatment of ICOs.
Jiasun Li is an assistant professor of finance at George Mason University. He received his Ph.D in finance from UCLA Anderson School of Management and B.S. in mathematics from Fudan University (Shanghai, China). His main research interest focuses on the interaction between blockchain, crowdfunding, and smart contract. He has presented his research at many prestigious institutions and conferences including MIT, Michigan, Northwestern, Yale, NBER, WFA, and Econometric Society. He is a winner of 2016 Yihong Xia Best paper award at CICF and 2014 CQA academic paper competition. He is also a frequent speaker for investment professionals.